



EIGHTH
EDITION

AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

A History

VOLUME
2

Since 1895

PATERSON • CLIFFORD • BRIGHAM • DONOGHUE • HAGAN • KISATSKY • MADDOCK

American Foreign Relations

A History

VOLUME 2: SINCE 1895

EIGHTH EDITION

Thomas G. Paterson

J. Garry Clifford

Robert Brigham

Michael Donoghue

Kenneth J. Hagan

Deborah Kisatsky

Shane J. Maddock



for

Stephen W. C. Paterson

Carol Davidge

Vera Low Hagan

Monica d. Church

Kevin Paul Donoghue

Emily Rose Maddock

Benjamin Quinn Maddock

About the Authors

Thomas G. Paterson is professor emeritus of history at the University of Connecticut and visiting professor of history at Southern Oregon University, Ashland. Born in Oregon, he graduated from the University of New Hampshire (B.A., 1963) and the University of California, Berkeley (Ph.D., 1968). He has written *Soviet-American Confrontation* (1973), *Meeting the Communist Threat* (1988), *On Every Front* (1992), *Contesting Castro* (1994), and *A People and a Nation* (with Mary Beth Norton et al., 2001). Tom has also edited *Cold War Critics* (1971), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory* (1989), *Imperial Surge* (with Stephen G. Rabe, 1992), *The Origins of the Cold War* (with Robert McMahon, 1999), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (with Michael J. Hogan, 2004), and *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations* (with Dennis Merrill, 2010). With Bruce Jentleson, Tom served as senior editor for the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations* (1997). Tom has sat on the editorial boards of the *Journal of American History* and *Diplomatic History*, in which he has also published several articles. Recipient of a Guggenheim fellowship, he has directed National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars for College Teachers. In 2000 the New England History Teachers Association recognized his excellence in teaching and mentoring with the Kidger Award. Besides visits to many U.S. campuses, Tom has lectured in Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, New Zealand, Puerto Rico, Russia, and Venezuela. He is a past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which in 2008 honored him with the Laura and Norman Graebner Award for "lifetime achievement" in scholarship, service, and teaching. He serves as general editor for the *Major Problems in American History* series (Cengage), now more than forty volumes, and continues to research and write the history of his French, Scottish, and Canadian ancestors.

J. Garry Clifford teaches at the University of Connecticut, where he is a professor of political science and former director of its graduate program. Born in Massachusetts, he earned his B.A. from Williams College (1964) and his Ph.D. in history from Indiana University (1969). He has also taught at the University of Tennessee and Dartmouth College and has participated in two National Endowment for the Humanities seminars for high school teachers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. For his book *The Citizen Soldiers* (1972), he won the Frederick Jackson Turner Award of the Organization of American Historians. With Norman Cousins he has edited *Memoirs of a Man: Grenville Clark* (1975), and with Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., he has written *The First Peacetime Draft* (1986). He also coauthored *America Ascendant* (with Thomas G. Paterson) in 1995. With Theodore A. Wilson, he edited and contributed to *Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays in Honor of Robert H. Ferrell* (2007). He also edited and annotated *The World War I Memoirs of Robert P. Patterson: A Captain in the Great War* (2012). Garry's chapters have appeared in Gordon Martel, ed., *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered* (1994); Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining*

the History of American Foreign Relations (1991 and 2004); and Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., *Victory in Europe, 1945* (2000), and in the *Journal of American History*, *Review of Politics*, *Mid-America*, *American Neptune*, *Peace and Change*, and *Diplomatic History*. Garry has served on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History* as well as on the editorial board of the Modern War Series of the University Press of Kansas. He continues to write and research on FDR and American intervention in World War II.

Robert. K. Brigham is the Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations at Vassar College, where he has taught since 1994. Born in New York, he earned his M.A. at the University of Rhode Island (1982) and his Ph.D. at the University of Kentucky (1994). Brigham is author of numerous books on American foreign relations, including *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (1998); *Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy* (1999) written with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight; *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army* (2006); *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (2006); *Iraq, Vietnam, and the Limits of American Power* (2008); *The Global Ho Chi Minh* (2013); *America and Iraq since 1990* (2013); and *The Wars for Vietnam*, written with Mark P. Bradley and Lien-Hang Nguyen (2015). Brigham has served on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*, and currently serves on the editorial advisory boards of *Passport* and on *Eyes on the ICC*, the only scholarly journal devoted to the study of the International Criminal Court. Brigham continues to research and write on humanitarian intervention.

Michael E. Donoghue is an associate professor of history at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Born in Providence, Rhode Island, he earned his B.A. (1993) at the University of Rhode Island and his Ph.D. (2005) from the University of Connecticut. Michael has written "Murder and Rape in the Canal Zone," in Jessica Gienow-Hecht, ed., *Decentering America: Culture and International History* (2007); "Race, Labor, and Security in the Panama Canal Zone," in Philip Muehlenbeck, ed., *Race, Ethnicity, and the Cold War: A Global Perspective* (2012); and "Harry S. Truman's Latin America Foreign Policy, 1945–1953," in Daniel S. Margolies, ed., *A Companion to Harry S. Truman* (2012). His articles and chapters on Panama and Latin America also appear in the *Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations* and the *Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America*. Michael's book *Borderland on the Isthmus: Race, Culture, and the Struggle for the Canal Zone* will appear in 2014. He is currently researching a book on U.S.-Cuban military relations, 1941–1964.

Kenneth J. Hagan is a former professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Monterey, California, and professor of history and museum director emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. He previously taught at Claremont McKenna College, Kansas State University, and as an adjunct at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. A native of California, he received his A.B. and M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley (1958, 1964), and his Ph.D. from the Claremont Graduate University (1970). Ken is the author of *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889* (1973), *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (1991), a comprehensive history of American naval strategy and policy since the Revolution, and coauthor with Ian J. Bickerton of *Unintended Consequences: The United States at War*

(2007), a critical reassessment of ten American wars from the Revolution to Iraq. He has edited two collections of original essays: *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History*, thirtieth anniversary edition (2008) and, with William Roberts, *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present* (1986). He has lectured on the history of U.S. naval strategy at the Canadian Forces College, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, conferences hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, and the U.S. National War College. Ken has given papers on naval and diplomatic history at professional meetings in Sweden, Greece, Turkey, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 2007 and 2008 he discussed the unintended consequences of war at Oxford University and at Strathclyde University in Glasgow, Scotland. For thirty years he advised the Naval ROTC college program on its naval history course. He currently is researching and writing about U.S. foreign and naval policy, 1890–1919. A retired captain in the naval reserve, Ken served on active duty with the Pacific Fleet from 1958 to 1963.

Deborah Kisatsky is associate professor of history at Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts. Born in Pennsylvania, she earned her B.A. (1990) and her Ph.D. (2001) from the University of Connecticut. Deborah published *The United States and the European Right, 1945–1955* with Ohio State University Press in 2005. She has published as well in *The American Historical Review*, *Intelligence and National Security*, *The Historian*, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, and the *Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations*. Deborah has received fellowships from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Center for European Integration Studies (University of Bonn), the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, and the Harry S. Truman Institute. She continues to research and write about the life, thought, and transnational legacy of the nineteenth-century communitarian and social radical Adin Ballou.

Shane J. Maddock is professor of history at Stonehill College in Easton, Massachusetts. Born in North Dakota, he earned his B.A. from Michigan State University (1989) and his Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut (1997). He also taught at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Shane has written *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (2010) and edited *The Nuclear Age* (2001). He also contributed a chapter to G. Kurt Piehler and Rosemary Mariner, eds., *The Atomic Bomb and American Society* (2008). Other works have appeared in the *New England Journal of History*, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, *Mid-America*, *History in Dispute*, and *The Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations*.

Contents

Preface xv

1 ***Imperialist Leap, 1895–1900*** 1

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD *The Maine, McKinley, and War, 1898* 2

The Venezuelan Crisis of 1895 5

American Men of Empire 9

Each in His Own Way: Cleveland and McKinley Confront
Cuba Libre, 1895–1898 11

WHAT IF ... Spain had granted independence to Cuba in 1898? 15

The Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War 17

Men versus “Aunties”: The Debate over Empire in the
United States 20

Imperial Collisions in Asia: The Philippine Insurrection and the Open
Door in China 22

The Elbows of a World Power, 1895–1900 29

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1895–1900 31

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 32

2 ***Managing, Policing, and Extending the Empire, 1900–1914*** 35

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD *Severing Panama from Colombia for the Canal, 1903* 36

Architects of Empire 41

Cuba’s Limited Independence under the Platt Amendment 45

The Constable of the Caribbean: The Roosevelt Corollary, Venezuela,
and the Dominican Republic 47

Bringing Yankee Order to Haiti and Nicaragua 49

Resisting Revolution in Mexico 52

Japan, China, and Dollar Diplomacy in Asia 56

The Anglo-American Rapprochement, New Empire Building,
and “Monstrous Shadows” 60

WHAT IF ... manliness and civilization had not become linked in the minds of American leaders in the period 1900–1917? 67

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1900–1914 68

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 70

3 War, Peace, and Revolution in the Time of Wilson, 1914–1920 74

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD The Sinking of the *Lusitania*, 1915 75

The Travails of Neutrality in a World at War 80

Submarines, Neutral Rights, and Mediation Efforts 83

Wilson's Choices Lead America into the World War 86

The Debate over Preparedness 89

The Doughboys Make a Difference in Europe 92

The Fourteen Points and a Contentious Peace Conference 95

Principle, Personality, Health, and Partisanship: The League Fight 99

WHAT IF ... the president had accepted Senate reservations and the United States had joined the League of Nations in 1919–1920? 104

Red Scare at Home and Abroad: Bolshevism and Intervention in Russia 105

The Whispering Gallery of Global Disorder 109

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1914–1920 111

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 113

4 Descending into Europe's Maelstrom, 1920–1939 116

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD Roosevelt Extends America's Frontier to the Rhine, 1939 117

“Prize Fighters with a Very Long Reach”: The Independent Internationalists 120

Economic and Cultural Expansion in a Ricketty World 126

Seekers of a World without War 131

Cold as Steel: Soviet-American Encounters 133

Hitler's Germany, Appeasement, and the Outbreak of War 137

American Isolationism and Myopic Neutrality 139

WHAT IF ... President Franklin D. Roosevelt had vetoed the Neutrality Acts in the 1930s? 141

Roosevelt Shifts and Congress Balks on the Eve of War 143

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1920–1939 146

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 148

5 *Asia, Latin America, and the Vagaries of Power, 1920–1939* 152

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD The Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1932 153

A Question of Interests and Power 155

Facing Japan: The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference and China 157

Japan's Footsteps toward Pacific Hegemony 161

WHAT IF . . . Americans had not sympathized with China over Japan after 1931? 165

Being "Neighborly" in Latin America 167

Creating "Frankenstein" Dictators in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti 171

Subverting Nationalism in Cuba and Puerto Rico 176

Accommodating Mexico 179

Pan Americanism, the Panama Canal, and Hemispheric Defense on the Eve of War 181

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1920–1939 183

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 185

6 *Survival and Spheres: The Allies and the Second World War, 1939–1945* 188

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD The Atlantic Charter Conference, 1941 189

Juggling between War and Peace, 1939–1941 192

The Road to Pearl Harbor: Japanese–American Relations, 1939–1941 197

The Big Three: Strategies and Fissures, 1941–1943 202

WHAT IF . . . the Allies had opened a second front in France before 1944? 204

The China Maze 209

Bystanders to the Holocaust 213

Planning the Postwar Peace, 1943–1945 216

Compromises at Yalta 220

To Each Its Own: Allied Divergence and Spheres of Influence 224

The Potsdam Conference and the Legacy of World War II 228

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1939–1945 231

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 234

7 **An All-Embracing Struggle: The Cold War Begins, 1945–1950** 238

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD **The Atomic Devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945** 239

Truman, Stalin, and the U.S.–Soviet Clash 244

Challenging the Soviets in Eastern Europe 248

“Getting Tough”: Early Cold War Crises 251

WHAT IF ... the United States and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement in 1946 to prevent the spread of atomic weapons? 256

“A Bolt of Lightning”: The Truman Doctrine, Israel, and Containment 257

Europe Divided: The Marshall Plan, Germany, and NATO 260

Allies and Adversaries in Asia 265

The People’s Republic of China and U.S. Nonrecognition 269

A Cold War Culture Emerges 271

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1945–1950 274

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 278

8 **Cold War Prism: The Korean War and Eisenhower-Dulles Foreign Relations, 1950–1961** 283

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD **The Decision to Intervene in the Korean War, 1950** 284

The Korean War and the “Trojan Horse” of American National Security 286

“The Great Equation”: Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy 292

Dulles, the New Look, and McCarthyism 296

The Glacier Grinds on: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the Cold War 299

Missiles, Berlin, and the “Stupid U-2 Mess” 304

To the Brink with China, to the Market with Japan 309

Nationalism, Neutralism, and the Third World 313

“Batten Down the Hatches”: Reform and Resistance in the Middle East and Latin America 318

WHAT IF ... the United States had used diplomacy rather than covert action to confront Third World nationalism during the 1950s? 323

American Cultural Expansion and the Cold War 325

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1950–1961 329

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 332

9 *Passing the Torch: The Vietnam Years, 1961–1969* 337

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD *The Tet Offensive in Vietnam, 1968* 338

Vietnamese Wars before 1961 342

Bear Any Burden? John F. Kennedy and His Foreign Policy Team 346

Arms Buildup, Berlin Crisis, and Nation-Building 349

The Most Dangerous Area in the World: The Cuban Revolution and Latin America 354

Spinning Out of Control: The Cuban Missile Crisis 356

Laos, Vietnam, and the Kennedy Legacy 362

WHAT IF . . . John F. Kennedy had lived to make key decisions on the Vietnam War? 366

Nose to Nose: Lyndon B. Johnson and the World 367

“The Biggest Damned Mess”: Johnson’s War 369

Hawks, Doves, Comrades, and Adversaries 375

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1961–1969 378

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 382

10 *Détente and Disequilibrium, 1969–1981* 386

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD *Richard M. Nixon’s Trip to China, 1972* 387

Nixon, Kissinger, and Their Critics 390

Détente, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race 393

Regional Tails Wagging the Superpower Dogs: The Middle East 399

Thinking Globally: Relations with Latin America and Africa 403

Number One Challenged: Economic Competition, Environmental Distress, and the North-South Debate 406

No Mere Footnote: Vietnamization, Cambodia, and a Wider War 411

The Peace Agreement, Withdrawal, and Defeat 414

The Lessons and Questions of Vietnam 417

Mixed Signals: Carter’s Contradictory Course 421

Engaging the Third World: Latin America and Africa 423

Middle East Highs and Lows: Camp David and the Iranian Hostage Crisis 430

WHAT IF . . . the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission had Succeeded? 433

Détente’s Downfall: Soviet-American Rivalry, Afghanistan, and the Carter Record 435

FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1969–1981 439

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 440

11 *A New World Order? Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, 1981–2001* 445

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---|-----|
| DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD | The Berlin Wall Comes Down, 1989 | 446 |
| | Gorbachev and the Earthquakes of 1989–1991 | 447 |
| | Ronald Reagan’s Crusade to Revive American Hegemony | 450 |
| | Soviet–American Crises and the Antinuclear Movement | 454 |
| | Civil Wars and Interventionism: Central America and the Caribbean | 458 |
| | Hornets’ Nests in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia | 463 |
| | Indispensable Nation: Bush, Clinton, and the Post–Cold War World | 468 |
| | Russian Disintegration, German Reunification, NATO Expansion, Balkan Hell | 472 |
| | Hope and Tragedy in Africa | 476 |
| | WHAT IF ... the United States had killed Osama bin Laden in August 1998? | 479 |
| | Invasions and Implosions in Latin America | 481 |
| | Mideast Imbrolios | 485 |
| | Feuding and Trading with China, Vietnam, and Japan | 489 |
| | Between Two Worlds: Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and the Legacies of the Cold War | 492 |
| | FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD 1981–2001 | 497 |
| | NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 | 501 |

12 *Millennial America: Foreign Relations since 2001* 505

| | | |
|-----------------------------|--|-----|
| DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD | 9/11 and After | 506 |
| | Personalities Matter: The Bush and Obama Foreign Policy Teams | 509 |
| | Present at a New Creation: The War on Terror, Afghanistan, and the Bush Doctrine | 514 |
| | “Slam Dunk”: Justifying the Iraq War | 518 |
| | Mission Accomplished? The Invasion and Occupation of Iraq | 520 |
| | Containing Evil and Spreading Freedom: The Bush and Obama Policies Toward the Middle East and Asia | 529 |
| | Getting a Sense of Their Souls: Europe, Latin America, and Africa in the Twenty-First Century | 536 |
| | Transnational Challenges and Opportunities | 543 |
| | WHAT IF ... Al Gore had become president in 2001? | 546 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Soft Power and America's Place in the World | 548 |
| FURTHER READING FOR THE PERIOD SINCE 2001 | 553 |
| NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 | 555 |

Appendix: Makers of American Foreign Relations **559**

General Bibliography **563**

| | |
|---|-----|
| General Reference Works | 563 |
| Overviews of Relations with Countries, Regions, and Other Places of the World, Including Atlases and Gazetteers (A), Annual Surveys and Chronologies (AS), Bibliographies (B), Biographical Aids (BA), Chronologies (C), Encyclopedias and Dictionaries (E), and Statistics (S) | 565 |
| Overviews of Subjects, Including Atlases (A), Annual Surveys (AS), Bibliographies (B), Biographical Aids (BA), Chronologies (C), Encyclopedias (E), and Statistics (S) | 575 |

Index **581**

Maps and Graphs

| | |
|--|-----|
| The Great Powers in Asia, 1900 | 28 |
| Panama Canal Zone | 39 |
| U.S. Interventions in the Caribbean and Central America | 50 |
| The <i>Lusitania</i> and <i>U-20</i> | 78 |
| The Outbreak of World War I Summer 1914 | 82 |
| Europe Reshaped by War and Peace | 100 |
| The Weight of the United States in the World Economy | 128 |
| The Contracting Spiral of World Trade | 129 |
| Japanese Expansion to 1941 | 164 |
| The German Onslaught, 1939–1942 | 194 |
| The Allies Push Japan Back, 1942–1945 | 226 |
| Changes in Europe after World War II | 250 |
| Changes in Asia after World War II | 268 |
| The Korean War, 1950–1953 | 287 |
| Africa in 1945 | 314 |
| Africa in 2000 | 315 |
| Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War | 374 |
| The Middle East | 400 |
| The United States and Latin America since 1945 | 425 |
| Transformations: Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe, and Germany | 448 |
| World Arms Exports, 1992–1994 | 493 |

Preface

When the authors published our first edition of this textbook in 1977, we were writing under the influence of the Vietnam War. As we publish today, we are similarly writing under the shadow of recent wars in the Middle East. Global events have continued to challenge American foreign relations since the seventh edition of this text appeared in 2009. The seemingly endless conflicts in Iraq (officially terminated in December 2011) and Afghanistan have been winding down under the leadership of President Barack Obama, who won reelection in November 2012 after a closely fought political campaign. Despite the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs in May 2011, Americans are still coping with putative nuclear threats from terrorist networks and so-called rogue states, including Iran and North Korea. U.S. attacks by high-flying “drones” against terrorist leaders have become a preferred instrument of covert warfare. Relations with former Cold War adversaries China and Russia continue to fluctuate, with China increasingly emerging as both a trade and investment partner and a competitor. A potential new relationship with Cuba after Fidel Castro remains elusive. Despite different approaches to recovery from the recent financial meltdown, global recession, and European debt crisis, Obama’s Washington has improved relations with its European allies, most notably in forging a cooperative response to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 that toppled autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen and ignited civil war in Syria. The expansion of Iranian nuclear facilities that might produce weapons to strike Israel as well as renewed violence between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs continue to challenge U.S. interests in the oil-rich Middle East. Also demanding greater attention are such borderless issues as fast-spreading deadly diseases, global warming, and environmental decline, not to mention the danger of cyber warfare and the challenge of governments everywhere to control secret information. The so-called WikiLeaks release of some 250,000 classified diplomatic documents in 2010, riots sparked by anti-Islam videos on YouTube, and the assassination in Benghazi, Libya, of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in September 2012 pointedly exposed the vulnerabilities of American diplomacy in a turbulent and interconnected world. These urgent contemporary developments, along with new scholarship and encouraging comments from instructors and students, have again prompted us to revise *American Foreign Relations*. As before, in this eighth edition we engage current perspectives on the United States’ interaction with the world. We seek to explain foreign relations in the broadest manner as the many ways that peoples, organizations, states, and systems interconnect—economic, cultural, strategic, environmental, political, and more.

We continue to emphasize the theme of expansionism, exploring its myriad manifestations. We also show that on almost every issue in the history of American foreign relations, alternative voices unfailingly sounded among and against official policymakers. Americans have always debated their place in the world, their wars,

their overseas commitments, and the status of their principles and power, and they have always debated the people of other nations about the spread of U.S. influence. We try to capture with vivid description and quotation the drama of these many debates.

For this new edition, we have added two new colleagues, Michael E. Donoghue and Robert K. Brigham. They have participated fully in the revision process, including reviewing all chapters and recommending changes to incorporate recent scholarship and themes in the field. Michael is a specialist in inter-American relations history and Latin American history, while Bob has written extensively on the history of Vietnam, the Vietnam War, and America's relations with Iraq. Although Shane Maddock and Deborah Kisatsky did not participate in this edition, we have retained their names as authors to thank them and recognize them for their important contributions to previous editions.

A historical overview such as this one necessarily draws on the invaluable work of scholars in the United States and abroad. Their expertise informs this book and lends it the authority that instructors and students have come to expect. Our "Further Reading" and "Endnotes" sections provide one way to thank them for their books, articles, and conference papers. We have also appreciated their recommendations for text revisions and their suggestions about teaching the courses for which this book is intended. We thank them, too, for challenging us to consider the many different approaches and theories that have commanded attention in this field, including world systems, corporatism, dependency, culture, ideology, psychology and personality, medical biography, human rights, lessons from the past, discourse analysis, bureaucratic politics, public opinion, executive-legislative competition, race, gender, national security and power, and the natural environment. This book also presents the findings of our own ongoing archival research and writing as we continually discover the past.

The subjects of diplomacy, war, economic intercourse, and politics remain central to our presentation of the foreign-relations story. We have made the last two editions more comprehensive by further extending our discussion of the cultural dimensions of foreign relations: how race-based and gendered thinking conditions the decision-making environment; how media and film reflect cultural myths and capture public perceptions of international events; how American mass culture (such as rock and roll and sports) proliferates worldwide with its innumerable effects; the relationship between travel, tourism, and expansionism; and the ways in which "public diplomacy"—the presentation of a positive image of the United States through media propaganda—reflects official U.S. efforts to employ culture in service to American foreign policy.

We have also increased our coverage of the self-conscious expansion of American empire from its westward displacement of Native Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to its overseas incarnations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In short, we use the word *empire* to characterize the expansionist project in the same way that Thomas Jefferson and the Founders did. We pay more attention to naval affairs, the early impact of the U.S. whaling industry, Indian removal, and U.S. relations with the Caribbean. We add new details about "makers" of American foreign relations from presidents such as Ulysses S.

Grant, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan to diplomats such as Nicholas Trist, Cordell Hull, and Hillary Clinton. We take note, for example, of new scholarship that shows how Americans brought their cultural artifacts, especially their love of baseball, when they went abroad—from the first baseball game played in Mexico in 1847, to influencing Cubans to replace bullfighting with “beisbol” as their national sport in the 1880s, to U.S. doughboys’ sandlot-honed skills at grenade-throwing in World War I, to the visit of Lefty O’Doul’s all-stars to Japan in 1949 in symbolizing that former enemy’s redemption and rebirth as a U.S. ally.

Amid such recent catastrophes as Hurricane Sandy, earthquakes in Haiti and Japan, volcanic eruptions in Iceland, floods in Pakistan, tsunamis in the Pacific, and oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, we continue to examine issues that spring from human interaction with the natural environment and the international conferences convened to deal with damage to the environment. American relations with Middle East countries before and after World War II receive more coverage, as do linkages between the civil rights movement and American relations with the Third World in the 1940s through the 1970s. Recent scholarship occasioned by such anniversaries as the War of 1812, the American Civil War, World War II, Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, among others, have prompted the release of new documents and brought fresh insights to these important events.

Equally important, with the Cold War International History Project providing scholars with a treasure trove of declassified documents from foreign archives (Russian, East German, Cuban, and Chinese among them), we have enriched our treatment of Joseph Stalin’s goals and tactics during and after World War II, the origins of the Korean War, Nixon’s opening to China in 1972, Cuban policy toward Africa, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the failure of détente in the 1970s, and the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. Similarly, recently declassified U.S. government documents made available via “electronic briefing books” from the National Security Archive have added nuance to our coverage, for example, of the attempted Hungarian Revolution (1956), U.S. reactions to secret contacts between North and South Vietnam in 1963, the India-Pakistan War of 1971, and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1976, as well as new evidence regarding Washington’s Cold War initiatives toward the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Castro’s Cuba. The declassification, duplication, and public release of presidential audio tapes from the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years help to recapture those leaders’ colorful language and reveal how the assumptions, styles, and emotions of presidents have influenced decision-making. Beginning with the seventh edition, we have reorganized the final three chapters of Volume II, reflective of an emerging consensus that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, commenced a new era in U.S. foreign relations history. Chapter 10 now covers the period 1969–1981, while Chapter 11 runs from 1981 to 2001. Our final chapter concentrates on events from 2001 to the present and includes expanded treatment of the Iraq War and U.S. policies toward Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan, as well as the events of President Obama’s presidency.

In preparing this edition, we once again immersed ourselves in the memoirs, diaries, letters, speeches, recorded tapes, and oral histories of U.S. and international

leaders. We often let them speak for themselves in the frankest terms, guarded and unguarded. We have sought to capture their anger and their humor, their cooperation and their competitiveness, their truths and their lies, their moments of doubt and times of confidence, their triumphs and setbacks. *American Foreign Relations*, in short, strives to capture the erratic pulse of international relations through peoples' struggles to plan, decide, and administer. We study not only the leaders who made influential decisions, but also the world's peoples who welcomed, resisted, or endured the decisions that profoundly influenced their lives. In this regard, we have drawn on the growing scholarship that studies non-state actors, including peace groups, African Americans, and international bodies such as the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE).

Each chapter opens with a significant and dramatic event—a “Diplomatic Crossroad”—that helps illustrate the chief characteristics and issues of the era. The introductory and concluding sections of each chapter set the themes. Illustrations—several of them new to this edition—from collections around the world, are closely tied to the narrative in image and caption description. Also beginning in the seventh edition, to generate student debate, we have added a new feature called “What If” to every chapter. We intend these speculative counterfactual essays to spark the reader's imagination as to what might have happened had leaders made different decisions or if conditions or events had turned out differently. What consequences might have followed had the British recognized the Confederacy during the Civil War? What if the United States had joined the League of Nations in 1919–1920? What if John F. Kennedy had lived to make the key decisions on Vietnam after 1963? What if Bill Clinton had succeeded in capturing or killing Osama bin Laden? We make no claim to definitive scholarly answers in these mini-essays. We hope, however, to excite appreciation for the counterfactual reasoning implicit in all historical writing and to stimulate discussion of many contingencies that together make up the history of American foreign relations.

The maps, graphs, and “Makers of American Foreign Relations” tables in each chapter provide essential information. The updated chapter bibliographies guide further reading and serve as a starting point for term or research papers. The “General Bibliography” at the end of the book is also a place to begin research or seek more information. The “General Bibliography” consists of three parts: first, general reference works, such as biographical dictionaries, atlases, statistics, encyclopedias, and bibliographies; second, overviews of U.S. relations with countries and regions, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe; and, third, overviews of subjects, such as Air Force and air power, CIA and covert action, Congress, cultural relations, ethnic conflict, human rights, isolationism, Manifest Destiny, Monroe Doctrine, oil, refugees, slave trade and slavery, terrorism, and United Nations.

In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China adopted a new system for rendering Chinese phonetic characters into the Roman alphabet. Called the Pinyin method, it replaced the Wade-Giles technique, which had long been used in English. Use of the Pinyin method is now common, and we use it in *American Foreign Relations*. Many changes are minor—Shantung has become Shandong and Mao Tse-tung has become Mao Zedong, for example. But when we have

a possibly confusing Pinyin spelling, we have placed the Wade-Giles spelling in parentheses—for example, Beijing (Peking) or Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).

Instructors and students interested in the study of foreign-relations history are invited to join the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). This organization publishes a superb journal, *Diplomatic History*, and a newsletter, *Passport*; offers book, article, and lecture prizes and dissertation research grants; and holds an annual conference where scholars present their views and research results. For information, contact the SHAFR Business Office (shafr.org), Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.

Another informative website is H-Diplo: Diplomatic History, found at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/>. Besides presenting provocative online discussions on foreign-relations history, including “Round Table” reviews of important recent books, this site also provides research and bibliographic aids and an extensive list of links to other useful resources, including journals, newspapers, archives and presidential libraries, research organizations such as the National Security Archive, and government agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State.

Many colleagues, friends, students, and editors contributed to this edition of *American Foreign Relations* by providing research leads, correction of errors, reviews of the text, library searches, documents and essays, and editorial assistance. We give our heartiest thanks to Steve Avella, Mark Boyer, Richard Breitman, David Brown, Frank Costigliola, Carol Davidge, Justus Doenecke, Susan Dunn, Blake Edwards, Robert H. Ferrell, Irwin Gellman, Charissa Keup, Christine Lounsbury, Jim Marten, Mike McMaster, Cony Metcalf, Masako Rachel Okura, Marc O’Reilly, Jeremy Pressman, Debbie Sharnak, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, and Mark Stoler. Cengage Learning’s talented team merits the highest of praise: Ann West, Megan Chrisman, and Liz Fraser.

We are also eager to thank the many people who helped us in previous editions: Philip J. Avillo, Jr., Richard Baker, Ann Balcolm, Michael A. Barnhart, Robert Beisner, Ian Bickerton, Michael Butler, R. Christian Berg, Kenneth J. Blume, Linda Blundell, Richard Bradford, Kinley J. Brauer, John Burns, Richard Dean Burns, Robert Buzzanco, Charles Conrad Campbell, Chen Jian, John Coogan, Alejandro Corbacho, Frank Costigliola, Carol Davidge, Mark Del Vecchio, Ralph Di Carpio, Justus Doenecke, Xavier Franco, Max Friedman, David Fogelson, Frances Gay, Jeff Greene, Paul Goodwin, James Gormly, Eric Hafter, Robert E. Hannigan, Hope M. Harrison, Ann Heiss, Alan Henrikson, Gregg Herken, George Herring, Ted Hitchcock, Joan Hoff, Kristin Hoganson, Reginald Horsman, Michael Hunt, Edythe Izard, Holly Izard, Richard Izard, Leith Johnson, Mary Kanable, Leslie Kauffman, Burton Kaufman, Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., Barbara Keys, Lorraine Lees, Thomas Lairson, Lester Langley, Jane Lee, Thomas M. Leonard, Li Yan, Terrence J. Lindell, Kyle Longley, Florencia Luengo, Paul Manning, Aileen Mason, Martha McCoy, David McFadden, Charles McGraw, Elizabeth McKillen, Matt McMahan, Robert McMahan, James T. McMaster, Elizabeth Mahan, Herman Mast, Dennis Merrill, Jean-Donald Miller, William Mood, Jay Mullen, Carl Murdock, Brian Murphy, R. Kent Newmyer, Arnold Offner, John Offner,

Marc O'Reilly, Chester Pach, Jerry Padula, Heather Perry, Carol Petillo, David Pletcher, Salvatore Prisco, Stephen G. Rabe, Carol S. Repass, Wayne Repeta, Barney J. Rickman III, Michael Roskin, John Rourke, Evan Sarantakes, Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Kent M. Schofield, David Sheinin, Anna Lou Smethurst, Elbert B. Smith, Kevin Smith, Thomas G. Smith, Larry Spongberg, Kenneth R. Stevens, Mark A. Stoler, Janice Wilbur, William W. Stueck, Jr., Duane Tananbaum, Chris Thornton, George Turner, Jonathan G. Utley, Thomas Walker, Wang Li, Kathryn Weathersby, Ralph E. Weber, Edmund S. Wehrle, Hal Wert, Immanuel Wexler, Lawrence Wittner, Sol Woolman, Jean Woy, Sherry Zane, and Thomas Zoumaras.

We welcome comments and suggestions from students and instructors.

T. G. P.

J. G. C.

R. K. B.

M. E. D.

K. J. H.

D. K.

S. J. M.



Imperialist Leap, 1895–1900



Naval Historical Foundation

The Battleship Maine Explodes. This imaginative contemporary artwork depicts the U.S. battleship blowing up in the early morning of February 15, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba. The warship had arrived three weeks earlier to protect American citizens caught up in the Cuban rebellion against Spanish rule. The deaths of 266 U.S. sailors in the explosion helped feed popular passions for war with Spain.

DIPLOMATIC CROSSROAD

◆ **The Maine, McKinley, and War, 1898**

THE BURLY U.S. battleship *Maine* steamed into Havana harbor on January 25, 1898. “A beautiful sight,” reported the American consul general Fitzhugh Lee, who had requested the visit ostensibly to protect the lives of Americans living in war-torn Cuba.¹ President William McKinley had sent the vessel to Havana hoping to calm tensions with Spain, then in its third year of battling Cuban rebels fighting for national independence. The *Maine* was to stay three weeks and then depart for New Orleans in time for Mardi Gras. But at 9:40 p.m. on February 15, a “dull sullen” roar followed by massive explosions ripped through the 6,700-ton ship, killing 266 Americans.² McKinley, who had been taking sedatives to sleep, awoke an hour before dawn to take a phone call from Secretary of the Navy John D. Long reporting the event. “The *Maine* blown up! The *Maine* blown up!” the stunned president kept muttering to himself.³ Even though “the country was not ready” for it, the war with Spain would begin three months later.⁴

McKinley ordered an official investigation of the *Maine* disaster and tried to gain time. With no evidence but with considerable emotion, many Americans assumed that the *Maine* had been “sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards.”⁵ In early March, U.S. Minister Stewart L. Woodford protested strongly to the Spanish government about the *Maine*. “End it at once—end it at once—end it at once,” he exhorted Madrid regarding the war in Cuba.⁶ On March 6 the president met with Representative Joe Cannon, chair of the House Appropriations Committee, and asked for \$50 million for war preparedness. “It seemed as though a hundred Fourths of July had been let loose in the House,” a clerk noted, as Congress enthusiastically obliged three days later.⁷

In mid-March Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, a friend of McKinley’s reportedly opposed to war, graphically told his colleagues about his recent visit to Cuba. He recounted ugly stories about Spain’s notorious reconcentration policy (the forced settlement of Cubans into fortified camps): “Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half died and one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved?”⁸ Shortly after this moving speech, which convinced many members of Congress and business leaders that Spain could not restore order to Cuba, the American court of inquiry on the *Maine* concluded that an external mine of unknown origin had destroyed the vessel. A Spanish commission at about the same time attributed the disaster to an internal explosion. More than a century later, after several more investigations, experts still disagree over whether the *Maine* blew up because of “a coal bunker fire” or from an “undership mine.”⁹ In 1898 vocal Americans pinned “the crime” squarely on Spain. “Remember the *Maine*, to hell with Spain” became a popular slogan.

A decorated veteran of the Civil War, President McKinley once asserted: “I have been through one war; I have seen the dead piled up, and I do not want

to see another.”¹⁰ He quietly explored the possibility of purchasing Cuba for \$300 million—or some other means “by which Spain can part with Cuba without loss of respect and with certainty of American control.”¹¹ But a jingoistic frenzy had seized Congress. Interventionist critics increasingly questioned the president’s manhood, claiming, as did Teddy Roosevelt, that he “had no more backbone than a chocolate éclair.”¹² One member of Congress called the president’s policies on Cuba “lame, halting, and impotent,” while another said of McKinley: “He wobbles, he waits, he hesitates. He changes his mind.”¹³ Following one stormy Senate session, Vice President Garrett Hobart warned McKinley: “They will act without you if you do not act at once.” “Say no more,” McKinley responded.¹⁴

On March 27, Washington cabled the president’s demands to Madrid: an immediate armistice, Cuban-Spanish negotiations to secure a peace, McKinley’s arbitration of the conflict if there was no peace by October, termination of the reconcentration policy, and relief aid to the Cubans. Implicit was the demand that Spain grant Cuba its independence under U.S. supervision. As a last-ditch effort to avoid American military intervention, the scheme had little chance of success. Spain’s national pride and interest precluded surrender. The Cubans had already said they would accept “nothing short of absolute independence.”¹⁵ Madrid’s answer nonetheless held some promise: Spain had already terminated reconcentration, would launch reforms, and would accept an armistice if the rebels did so first. Yet by refusing McKinley’s mediation and Cuban independence, the Spanish reply failed to satisfy the president and Congress. McKinley composed a war message in early April. On April 9, Spain made a new concession, declaring a unilateral suspension of hostilities “for such a length of time” as the Spanish commander “may think prudent.”¹⁶ Too qualified, the declaration still sidestepped Cuban independence and U.S. mediation. Any chance of united European support for Spain faded when the British told Washington that they would “be guided [on Cuban issues] by the wishes of the president.”¹⁷

On April 11, McKinley asked Congress for authority to use armed force to end the Cuban war. Since neither Cubans nor Spaniards could stem the flow of blood, Americans would do so to serve the “cause of humanity” and prevent “very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and the wanton destruction of property.” Citing the *Maine*, he described the conflict as “a constant menace to our peace.” He conspicuously made no mention of Cuban independence, defining the U.S. purpose as “forcible intervention...as a neutral to stop the war.” At the very end of the message, McKinley asked Congress to give “your just and careful attention” to news of Spain’s recently offered armistice.¹⁸

As Congress debated, McKinley beat back a Senate attempt to recognize the rebels. He strongly believed that Cuba needed American tutelage to prepare for self-government. And he wanted a Cuba subservient to the United States. Indeed, as the historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr., has argued, McKinley’s decision for war seemed directed “as much against Cuban independence as it was against Spanish sovereignty.”¹⁹ Congress did endorse the Teller Amendment, which disclaimed any U.S. intent to annex the island. Even Teddy Roosevelt supported this amendment to the joint resolution authorizing the use of force to achieve Cuban independence lest “it seem that we are merely engaged in a land-grabbing war.”²⁰ On April



William McKinley (1843–1901).

In one of his last speeches before his death in 1901, McKinley peered into the next century: “How near one to the other is every part of the world. Modern inventions have brought into close relations widely separated peoples...distances have been effaced.... The world’s products are being exchanged as never before... isolation is no longer possible or desirable.”

(Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division Washington [LC-USZ62-5627])

19 both houses of Congress passed the resolution proclaiming Cuba's independence (without recognizing the Cuban junta), demanding Spain's evacuation from the island, and directing the president to use force to secure these goals. Spain broke diplomatic relations on April 21. The next day U.S. warships began to blockade Cuba; Spain declared war on April 24. Congress issued its own declaration the next day.

Because of the Teller Amendment, the choice for war seemed selfless and humane, and for many Americans it undoubtedly was. But the decision had more complex motives. McKinley cited humanitarian concerns, property, commerce, and the removal of a dangerous regional disturbance. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge invoked politics, telling the White House that "if the war in Cuba drags on through the summer...we [Republicans] shall go down to the greatest defeat ever known."²¹ Important business leaders, initially hesitant, shifted in March and April to demand an end to Cuban disorder. Farmers and entrepreneurs ogling Asian and Latin American markets thought a U.S. victory over Spain might open new trade doors by eliminating a colonial power. Republican Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, later an anti-imperialist, could not "look idly on while hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings...die of hunger close to our doors. If there is ever to be a war it should be to prevent such things."²² Another senator claimed that "any sort of war is better than a rotting peace that eats out the core and heart of the manhood of this country."²³ Christian missionaries dreamed of new opportunities to convert the "uncivilized." Imperialists hoped that war would add new territories to the United States and encourage the growth of a larger navy. "Warriors" differed from "imperialists" in that the former group opposed empire and sincerely thought war would halt the protracted conflict in Cuba, whereas imperialists seized on war as an opportunity to expand the American empire.

Emotional nationalism also made an impact. The *Maine* and de Lôme (see page 15) incidents ignited what one educator called the "formidable inflammability of our multitudinous population."²⁴ Imperialist senator Albert Beveridge waxed ebullient: "At last, God's hour has struck. The American people go forth in a warfare holier than liberty—holy as humanity."²⁵ Excited statements by people such as Roosevelt, who regarded war as a sport, aroused martial fevers. War would surely redeem national honor and repudiate those "old women of both sexes, shrieking cockatoos" who made virile men "wonder whether" they lived "in a free country or not."²⁶ Newspapers of the "yellow press" variety, such as William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World*, sensationalized stories of Spanish lust and atrocities. Other war hawks proudly compared the Cuban and American revolutions. The American public, already steeped in a brash nationalism and prepared by earlier diplomatic and military triumphs, reacted favorably to the hyperbole.

Both Washington and Madrid had tried diplomacy without success. McKinley wanted "peace" and some form of independence for Cuba under U.S. oversight. The first Spain could not deliver because the Cuban rebels sensed victory and complete independence, while Spanish forces remained weak. The second Spain could not grant immediately because ultranationalists might overthrow the constitutional Bourbon monarchy. Spain promised to fight the war more humanely and

grant autonomy, but McKinley and Congress wanted more. They believed they had the right and duty to judge the affairs of Spain and Cuba. "To save Cuba, we must hold it," noted one reporter.²⁷

Well-meaning or not, American meddling prevented Cubans and Spaniards from settling their own affairs. Sending the *Maine* and asking Congress for \$50 million to prepare for war almost certainly encouraged the Cuban rebels to resist any compromise. The president's motives were not crystalline, and his faltering diplomacy reflected his hesitations and uncertainties. McKinley could have given Spain more breathing space. Spain, after all, did grant partial autonomy, which ultimately might have led to Cuban independence, yet it is unlikely that McKinley wanted unfettered Cuban independence. Some critics said the president should have recognized the Cuban insurgents and covertly aided them. American matériel, not men, might have liberated Cuba from Spanish rule. By April 1898, one U.S. official concluded that Spain had become "absolutely hopeless,...exhausted financially and physically, while the Cubans are stronger."²⁸ McKinley wanted to avoid war and chose it reluctantly only after trying other options. That he adamantly refused to recognize the insurgency or the republic indicates he did not endorse outright Cuban independence. He probably had two goals in 1898: to remove Spain from Cuba and to control Cuba in some manner as yet ill-defined. When the Spanish balked at a sale and both belligerents rejected compromise, McKinley chose war—the only certain means to oust Spain *and* to control Cuba. For better or for worse, his decision caused a new and enlarged American empire to arise shimmering on the horizon.

The Venezuelan Crisis of 1895

Three years earlier, during the administration of an avowedly anti-imperialist president, a seemingly insignificant cartographic controversy in South America had served as a catalyst for empire. In July 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney personally handed to President Grover Cleveland a 12,000-word draft document on the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. The president, thinking it "the best thing of its kind I ever read," suggested some "softened verbiage here and there" and directed that Olney send the document to London, which he did on July 20.²⁹

What became known as Olney's "twenty-inch gun" pointed directly at Great Britain, which had long haggled with Venezuela over the boundary separating that country from the colony of British Guiana. The British drew a line in the 1840s, but nobody liked it. In the 1880s, the discovery of gold in the disputed region raised the stakes. At issue, too, was control of the mouth of the Orinoco River, gateway to the potential trade of northern South America. Since the 1870s, Venezuela had appealed to the United States over Britain's alleged violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Washington repeatedly asked the British to submit the issue to arbitration but met constant rebuff. London's latest refusal in December 1894 led to Olney's rejoinder, the "twenty-inch gun."

The Venezuelans had hired William L. Scruggs, a former U.S. minister to Caracas, to propagandize their case before the American public. His widely

circulated pamphlet *British Aggression in Venezuela, or the Monroe Doctrine on Trial* (1895) stirred considerable sympathy for the South American nation. Stereotypes soon replaced reasoned analysis: The land-grabbing British were robbing a poor hemispheric friend of the United States. A unanimous congressional resolution of February 1894 called for arbitration, underscoring U.S. concern. Cleveland's Democratic party had lost badly in the 1894 elections, and Republicans were attacking his administration as cowardly for not annexing Hawai'i. Bold action might deflect partisan criticism and recoup Democratic electoral losses. One Democrat advised Cleveland: "Turn this Venezuelan question up or down, North, South, East or West, and it is a 'winner.'"³⁰

The global imperial competition of the 1890s also pushed the president toward action. The British, already holding large stakes in Latin America, seemed intent on enlarging their share. Like the French intervention in Mexico a generation earlier, London's claim against Venezuela became a symbol of European intrusion into the hemisphere. The economic depression of the 1890s also caused concern. Many Americans, including Cleveland, thought that overproduction had caused the slump and that expanding foreign trade could cure it. The National Association of Manufacturers, organized in 1895 to encourage exports, chose Caracas as the site of its first overseas display of American products. Might the British close this potential new market?

Nor did Cleveland like bullies. He had already rejected Hawaiian annexation in part because he thought Americans had unfairly victimized the Hawaiians. Now the British were arrogantly slapping the Venezuelans. Defense of the Monroe Doctrine became his and Olney's maxim. In unvarnished language, the "twenty-inch gun" of



"The Real British Lion." This is a popular American depiction of the British global presence during the crisis over Venezuela. A few years later, President Cleveland himself recalled British behavior as "mean and hoggish." (*New York Evening World*, 1895)



“If There Must Be War.” Lord Salisbury and President Grover Cleveland slug it out during the Venezuelan crisis of 1895. Britain’s ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, simplistically blamed the war scare on sensationalist U.S. newspapers whose “stream of mendacity and audacity and ignorance and malice and general blackguardism... is swallowed by millions and does infinite mischief.”

July 20, 1895, warned that the ongoing European partition of Africa should not repeat itself in Latin America. The “safety,” “honor,” and “welfare” of the United States were at stake, and the Monroe Doctrine stipulated that “any permanent political union between a European and an American state [was] unnatural and inexpedient.” The Cleveland–Olney message stressed that “the states of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of government constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any one of them by a European power... signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations with us.” The forceful overriding theme of the note boldly addressed an international audience. “To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” And more expansively: The United States’ “infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.”³¹ Finally, the message demanded arbitration, threatened U.S. intervention, and requested a British answer before Cleveland’s annual message to Congress in December.

British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury received the missive with some surprise and sent it to the Foreign Office for study. Preoccupied by dangerous crises in South Africa, Salisbury detected no urgency in this latest Yankee gasconade. In the late nineteenth century, American Anglophobic bombast was not unusual,

especially before elections. Thus, by ignoring the problem in the hope that the “conflagration will fizzle away,” Salisbury did not reply until after Cleveland’s annual message, which was actually quite tame on Venezuela.³² The British note, which smacked of the “peremptory schoolmaster trying—with faded patience—to correct the ignorance of dullards in Washington,” denied the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine and dismissed any valid U.S. interest in the controversy.³³

On reading the note, Cleveland became “mad clean through.”³⁴ His special message to Congress on December 17 rang the alarm: England must arbitrate; the United States would create an investigating commission to set the true boundary line; unless London acquiesced, the United States would intervene by “every means in its power.”³⁵ Congress quickly voted funds for the commission. Republicans and Democrats rallied behind the president, and New York City police commissioner Theodore Roosevelt boomed: “Let the fight come if it must; I don’t care whether our sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”³⁶ Jingoist though he was, Roosevelt grasped the classic underlying reality of nineteenth century Anglo-American relations: one was an invincible sea power, the other unconquerable on land. With Irish Americans volunteering to fight their ancient foe, the British ambassador reported: “Nothing is heard but the voice of the Jingo bellowing defiance to England.”³⁷

War fevers cooled rapidly in early 1896. Many bankers and business leaders grew panicky when the stock market plummeted, in part because British investors were pulling out. The *New York World* put out a special Christmas issue with portraits of the Prince of Wales and Lord Salisbury under the headline “PEACE AND GOOD WILL,” suggesting the irrationality of war with Britain, a country so close in race, language, and culture.³⁸ Even the U.S. ambassador in London feared the president had been “too precipitate” in joining “the camp of aggressiveness.”³⁹ But Cleveland never wanted war. He wanted peace on his terms.

What followed seemed anticlimactic. The British cabinet in early January 1896 decided to seek an “honourable settlement” with the United States.⁴⁰ Facing a new dispute with Germany over South Africa, England needed friends, not enemies. Formal talks continued until November 1896, when the United States and Britain agreed to set up a five-person arbitration board to define the boundary. Finally, in October 1899—after the American imperialistic victory in the war with Spain, and while Washington was promulgating the “Open Door” notes to protect China from dismemberment—the tribunal reached a decision that rejected the extreme claims of either party and generally followed the original boundary from the 1840s. The mouth of the Orinoco went to Venezuela, which came out of the dispute rather well, considering that neither the United States nor Britain cared much about Venezuela’s national interest. In fact, both parties excluded Venezuela’s duly accredited minister in Washington from the talks. Lobbyist William Scruggs complained that the United States sought to “bull-doze Venezuela.”⁴¹ He had it right, but Washington’s “sledgehammer subtlety” targeted others besides that South American nation.⁴² The overweening theme of the “twenty-inch gun” merits repeating as an operative principle of U.S. foreign policy: “To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”⁴³

American Men of Empire

The Venezuelan crisis and the war with Spain capped an era of imperialist competition when, as one senator grandiosely put it: “The great nations are rapidly absorbing...all the waste areas of the earth. It is a moment which makes for civilization and the advancement of the race.”⁴⁴ In the spirit of that moment, Presidents Cleveland and McKinley helped move the United States toward world-power status. As examples of forceful, even aggressive, diplomacy, both events accelerated important trends. They stimulated what critics at the time called “jingoism,” that is, loud-mouthed superpatriotism. Besides ignoring the rights and sensibilities of small countries, both episodes revealed a United States more assertive and confident about the components of its “policy” and more willing to confront rivals. Cleveland’s face-off with Britain over Venezuela and McKinley’s ultimatum to Spain over Cuba gave the Monroe Doctrine new status as a curb against European meddling in the Western Hemisphere. In the pair of highly provocative assertions of American hegemony, the two presidents shucked off much of the executive’s subservience to Congress that had characterized the post-Civil War decades, although, as the Teller Amendment showed, the national legislature could still exert a limited influence on foreign policy.

In both crises Latin Americans learned again that the United States sought supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and would intervene whenever it saw fit. The Venezuelan eruption and the outbreak of revolution in Cuba in 1895 intensified North American interest in the Caribbean, a significant dimension of which was economic. Coinciding with a severe economic depression at home, the potential loss of markets in Venezuela and Cuba brought more attention to the theory of overproduction as a cause of depression, which increased exports could allegedly cure. Commercial expansion, always an objective of U.S. foreign policy, received another boost.

The discord with Britain over Venezuela ironically helped foster Anglo-American rapprochement. Cooperation and pursuit of mutual interests increasingly characterized relations between Washington and London. British diplomats cultivated U.S. friendship as a possible counterweight to growing German naval power, and Britain’s support over Cuba and its subsequent deference to the United States regarding the Caribbean facilitated the emerging entente.

Makers of American Foreign Relations, 1895–1900

| Presidents | Secretaries of State |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Grover Cleveland, 1893–1897 | Walter Q. Gresham, 1893–1895 Richard Olney, 1895–1897 |
| William McKinley, 1897–1901 | John Sherman, 1897–1898 William R. Day, 1898 John Hay, 1898–1905 |

The chief mechanism by which the United States sought to manage events in that area was through naval power. The Venezuelan affair, joined by crises in Asia and the belief that naval construction would employ those idled by the depression, stimulated additional naval expansion. The Navy Act of 1896, for example, provided for three new battleships and ten new torpedo boats, critical additions that contributed to the naval victories over Spain two years later.

By the end of the decade the United States had gained new U.S. colonies in the Pacific, Asia, and the Caribbean, a protectorate over Cuba, and Europe's recognition of U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. By 1900, too, the United States had pledged itself to preserve the Open Door in China; it had built a naval armada that had just annihilated the Spanish navy; its battle fleet now ranked alongside the Imperial German Navy as a principal challenger to the dominance of Great Britain's "mammoth imperial fleet"; and it had developed an annual export trade amounting to \$1.5 billion.⁴⁵ Steel and iron production exemplified its industrial might, which almost equaled that of Britain and Germany combined. U.S. acquisition of new colonies after the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War superficially suggests that *only then*, about 1898, did the United States become an imperialist world power. But what actually happened, one scholar writes, was a "culmination" not an "aberration."⁴⁶ Having taken halting steps toward empire before the depression of the 1890s, the United States now took a giant imperialist leap.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt described the anti-imperialists in 1897 as "men of a by-gone age" and "provincials."⁴⁷ Indeed, anti-imperialism waned in the late nineteenth century. Increasing numbers of educated, economically comfortable Americans made the case for formal empire (colonies or protectorates) or informal empire (commercial domination). Naval officers, diplomats, politicians, farmers, skilled artisans, business leaders, and clergy made up what political scientists call the "foreign-policy public," who influenced mass opinion through their management of the printing press and the public lectern. This "elite," aided by the hawkish clamoring of the "yellow press," helped the McKinley administration maneuver America toward war and empire.

Analysis of the phrase "public opinion" helps explain the *hows* as distinct from the *whys* of decision making. One often hears that "public opinion" or "the man in the street" influenced a leader to follow a certain course of action. But "public opinion" did not comprise a unified, identifiable group speaking with one voice. Political leaders and other articulate, knowledgeable people often shaped the "public opinion" they wanted to hear by their very handling of events and their control over information. In trying to determine who the "people" are and what "public opinion" is, political scientists have demonstrated that in the 1890s the Americans who counted, those who expressed their opinion publicly in order to influence policy, numbered no more than 1.5 million to 3 million, or between 10 and 20 percent of the voting public, and all were males. These elites—upper- and middle-income groups, highly educated, active politically—constituted the "foreign-policy public." Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham observed in 1893: "After all, public opinion is made and controlled by the thoughtful men of the country."⁴⁸ The public opinion the president heard